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Abstract. This article investigates the systems engineering issues involved in the design of mi-
crogrid systems for military installations.  A review of how microgrids function including major 
system elements is provided from a systems engineering perspective for non-microgrid experts. 
Specific issues that systems engineers are beginning to address and that remain to be addressed 
are highlighted.  The activities of the INCOSE Critical Infrastructure Protection and Recovery 
(CIPR) Working Group demonstrate the growing importance of systems engineers to addressing 
microgrid issues. The increasing interest within the US Department of Defense in improving mi-
crogrids on installations shows the need to address issues that are specific to military microgrids. 
Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest consumer of electricity in the United States 
(ODASD(IE) (2016)). The DoD relies on the uninterrupted delivery of electrical power to operate 
systems and installations to accomplish their national security mission. As reliable as the electricity 
grid is though, it is not perfect in its delivery of power. Outages still occur due to a variety of 
environmental, equipment, and human failures. In 2015 alone, DoD installations experienced 127 
electricity outages due to weather and equipment failures that lasted eight hours or longer (DOE 
(2017)). The number of outages increased to 507 in FY2016, 1,205 outages in FY2017 
((ODASD(IE)) (2018)). In addition to outages caused by weather and failures, the DoD has many 
overseas bases dependent on local utilities for power making them vulnerable to power disruptions 
due to geo-political events.  Finally, military bases must consider intentional attacks on the elec-
trical grid, which no doubt are part of many adversaries’ plans.  DoD functions and activities de-
pend on the availability of energy; consequently, the issue of energy security needs to be addressed 
in both a systematic and systemic way to assure mission accomplishment.   
The U.S. Department of Energy defines microgrids as, “a group of interconnected loads and dis-
tributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single control-
lable entity with respect to the grid.  A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the grid to 
enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island mode” (Ton and Smith (2012)).  The IEEE 
defines characteristics of microgrids to include the above as well as identifying a microgrid as 
being intentionally designed as such (IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 21 (2011)).  The 
definitions of a microgrid define for us the system-of-interest as given by the electrical boundaries 
controlled by the installation.  From the military perspective, the military organization generally 
controls the microgrid, which can function whether connected or not to the external provider.  Two 
types of military installations exist:  military installations connected to the public utility, and mil-
itary installations on islands or other remote locations that provide 100% of their own power.  
The U.S. Navy has been developing microgrids at Navy shore-side facilities with the objective of 
increasing energy security.  Energy security can be thought of on multiple levels, from national 
strategy down to tactical [local] installation level.  Energy security at the installation level has three 
components: reliability, resilience, and efficiency.  Energy reliability is the percentage of time the 
energy delivery systems, external power grid plus microgrid, can supply stable, installation well-
mannered electricity to its customers.  Energy resilience refers to the electrical supply's ability to 
anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover 
rapidly from disruptions to the external energy supply or installation power disruptions and fail-
ures.  Energy efficiency is the ability of the installation to minimize the energy demand of its 
operations without sacrificing operational performance.  By public law (10 USC Ch. 173 section 
2911), the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is required to "...ensure the readiness of the armed 
forces for their military missions by pursuing energy security and energy resilience." The SECDEF 
is given statutory authority to authorize the use of energy security and energy resilience as factors 
when conducting cost-benefit analysis for the procurement of energy, and to give favorable con-
sideration to projects that will use renewable energy sources to provide power to military facilities 
or to an installation’s electrical grid.  Consequently, for military microgrids all decisions must 
consider tradeoffs between energy security and the cost of the energy. 
The majority of research on microgrids deals with technical challenges in isolation without con-
sideration of the operational context (see for example (Parhizi et al. (2015)) and (Salam et al. 
(2008))).  Hence, we see a need for identifying microgrid research issues relevant to the systems 
engineering community and specifically to the concerns unique to military installations.  The sys-
tems engineering perspective differs from many of the technological and discipline specific ap-
proaches to microgrid design because a systems engineering approach views microgrids as a whole 
system,  considers both  operational effectiveness and suitability of the microgrid design, and an-
alyzes the microgrid in the context of the larger power grid and other systems it is a part of.  Hence, 
a systems engineering perspective considers the integration of the many components of a microgrid 
and how they work together to deliver operational capabilities.  This paper reviews the research 
issues concerning microgrids for military facilities from a systems engineering perspective.  While 
our focus is on military bases, we believe almost all of the issues are relevant to microgrids in 
general.  The intent is to provide guidance on where the systems engineering community needs to 
concentrate our efforts to advance the development and installation of microgrid solutions.   
System Perspective of Microgrid Design and Operation 
This section presents a systems engineering perspective of microgrid design and operation.  Spe-
cifically, we consider:1) System Purpose, 2) Stakeholders, 3) System Boundaries, 4) Functional 
Requirements, 5) System Architecture, and 6) System Operating Modes. 
One of the first questions to consider in designing a system is what is the purpose of the system? 
The answer to this question is usually documented in a problem statement which serves to focus 
the design, development, and integration effort. All systems are designed for one or more purposes, 
which guide the system development process.  The second issue is to identify all of the stakehold-
ers and their needs with respect to the system.  To fulfill its purpose the system performs one or 
more functions which establish the basic requirements for the system.  The system engineer is then 
involved with designing the system architecture, which shows the structure of the system elements 
and the relationships between the elements.  Finally, the system engineering must be concerned 
with all the lifecycle issues encountered during acquisition through disposal of the microgrid. 
System Purpose 
The DoD’s priority for microgrids is to ensure mission readiness through energy security 
((ODASD(IE)) (2018)). Secondary goals for the DoD include percentage of renewable energy used 
for facility energy needs to meet policy guidance (DOD (2019)).  The U.S. Navy defines energy 
security as consisting of three pillars: reliability, resilience, and efficiency (Savena et al. (2017)). 
Microgrids for shore-side installations must support all three.  Of the three, resiliency is of the 
greatest interest because military bases must contend with the same disruptions as civilian infra-
structure due to weather, failed equipment, changing loads, etc., but military bases must also con-
sider additional threats due to malicious attacks.  Malicious attacks may be physical attacks on the 
infrastructure or cyber-attacks on the communication and control system, or a combination of both. 
The DoD defines energy resilience as “The ability to prepare for and recover from energy disrup-
tions that impact mission assurance on military installations” (of Defense (2009)). The definition 
aligns with the larger literature in the domain.  We describe resilience as four phases starting with 
(1) the baseline phase during which the system has normal performance, (2) the vulnerable phase
when the system degrades following a disruption event, (3) the recovery phase during which the
system improves its performance due to restorative efforts until it reaches (4) the recovered phase
(Yodo and Wang (2015)).
Energy efficiency seeks to reduce waste and use the minimum amount of energy required for the 
operational mission.  The DoD views energy efficiency as a potential force multiplier by extending 
the range and endurance of its forces, as well as reducing energy costs.   
Consequently, military microgrids have the purpose to provide and distribute energy, provide en-
ergy security, and to do it as inexpensively as possible.  The design decisions impacting the mi-
crogrid must take into consideration all these objectives. 
Stakeholders 
Identifying the relevant stakeholders is a first step towards establishing operational requirements 
for a microgrid. Military installations are often partitioned into a base (installation) command and 
one or more tenant commands.  The base command is responsible for the acquisition, operation, 
and maintenance of the base, which includes the microgrid.  Whereas the tenant commands are 
situated within the installation and are the users of the microgrid.  Additionally, the local energy 
company the microgrid is connected to, the microgrid provider, and any organizations for the 
maintenance and upkeep of the microgrid are stakeholders.  Each installation reports to a higher 
authority in the military chain of command, including key stakeholders who fund the microgrid 
and related energy security projects. 
System Boundaries 
A system has both physical boundaries 
and functional boundaries.  The system 
engineering perspective views the entire 
system including the physical equip-
ment, software, processes, and people as 
the system.  Adopting this holistic per-
spective changes how we approach en-
ergy security of the microgrid.  For ex-
ample, recovery from a disruption de-
pends on the availability of spares, abil-
ity to troubleshoot the problem, training 
of the maintenance crew, and so forth. 
Many existing research papers on resili-
ence and energy security take a narrow 
view of the system as consisting of just 
the microgrid.  Figure 1 depicts the con-
text of a military facility microgrid from 
a systems engineering perspective. 
The major external interface is between the microgrid and the external power grid. 
Functional Requirements 
The functional analysis of microgrids provides a means to organize and discuss microgrid require-
ments and design.  Figure 2 shows the top-level functions of a microgrid.  A microgrid provides 
the following minimum functionality:  generate power, distribute power, control power distribu-
tion, and often a microgrid will also provide the function of storing power. Additional functionality 
might be required, here we only define the minimum.  A microgrid needs to generate sufficient 
power to meet critical loads while in island mode.  The microgrid must be able to distribute power 
Figure 1: The Microgrid Context from a Systems 
Engineering Perspective. 
to where it is required.  Con-
trol is the most complex of 
the basic functionality and 
includes managing the mi-
crogrid so it can seamlessly 
connect and disconnect 
from the grid, load balanc-
ing, controlling frequency, 
controlling voltage, moni-
toring and controlling stor-
age, and optimizing mi-
crogrid operations (Castillo 
et al. (2016)). The function to store energy is not absolutely required, but in any actual installation 
energy storage is necessary because the load and energy generation are almost never matched when 
operating in island mode.  Moreover, energy storage aids some of the control functions and stabil-
ity. Consequently, the system must store energy from when energy generation exceeds demand in 
order to meet requirements when demand exceeds generation. 
Below is a breakdown of lower-level functions within the functional model: 
1. Generate Power
1.1. Generate Electrical Power
1.2. Adjust Power Production
2. Distribute Power
2.1. Transmit Power
2.2. Control Power Flow
2.3. Convert Power
3. Control Microgrid
3.1. Measure Microgrid State
3.2. Process Measurements (Make Control Decisions)




4.3. Adjust Power Flow
Generate Power: A variety of power generation sources can be used on microgrids.  Many mili-
tary microgrids use the external grid as their primary power source.  Most microgrids also include 
one or more distributed energy resources (DER), which are local energy generation sources such 
as fossil-fuel based generators and power plants (gas turbine, oil plant, diesel generator, coal plant, 
etc.), renewable power sources (solar, wind, micro hydro, wave power, etc.), and other sources 
(fuel cells with a variety of fuel sources, garbage incinerator power plants, biomass plants, etc.). 
Occasionally, unconventional generation sources such as plug-in hybrid vehicles may be used to 
generate energy. 
Microgrid power generation may be either peaking power generation, load following, base gener-
ation, or intermittent generation (DOE (2017), Kaplan (2008)).  On some microgrids, a mixture of 
all four generation types may be found.  For instance, a microgrid may have an oil-fired power 
Figure 2: A High-Level Microgrid Functional Model.
plant providing base generation capacity, a solar array providing intermittent generation, and a fast 
start gas turbine generator that provides load following capability. 
Distribute Power:  Microgrids use several methods of transmitting energy between generation 
sources, the grid, energy storage systems, and loads.  The most common are AC and DC power 
lines and buses.  These usually take the form of overhead cables and wires (insulated or uninsu-
lated) or underground cables (direct bury, in a conduit or wire race, or otherwise protected from 
the earth).  In some systems, transformers may be used to step up and/or step down voltage.  AC 
energy transmission is generally used when there are longer distances between nodes in the mi-
crogrid network.  DC energy transmission is often found in specialized microgrid applications such 
as computer server farms or facilities with large quantities of sensitive electronics. DC energy 
transmission is also sometimes found in facilities with large amounts of DC power generated via 
renewable resources to reduce losses in the power distribution system from DC to AC power con-
version (Shaver (2017)). 
Control Microgrid:  Microgrid control includes many sub-problems making it a complex prob-
lem.  The control problem depends on the state of the microgrid, whether it is grid connected or 
islanded, as well as switching between these states.  Microgrid control is further complicated by 
controlling different microgrid characteristics, simultaneously, at multiple timescales ranging from 
mili-seconds through minutes and hours.  
Microgrid controls may also encompass load shedding through direct control of non-critical loads 
(Brooks et al. (2010)) such as heating and air conditioner loads.  The microgrid control problem is 
often conceptualized as hierarchical control at three levels of authority.  Primary controllers (some-
times referred to as droop controls) operate generators and storage sources to maintaining the sta-
bility of frequency and voltage within a predefined range of values in intervals measured in mili-
seconds.  Secondary controllers coordinate generation and storage across the microgrid for power 
quality control, power flow control, and synchronization.  Tertiary controllers operate the grid 
connect/disconnect switch and regulate if power is being taken from the grid or fed back to the 
grid. Tertiary control addresses the economics of operating the microgrid.  Microgrid controls may 
perform load shedding through direct control of non-critical loads such as heating and air condi-
tioner loads (Brooks et al. (2010)). 
Several researchers are addressing various aspects of the microgrid control problem because mi-
crogrid control introduces many issues not present in control of the overall power grid.  For exam-
ple, the power supplied by solar and wind vary with the weather and consequently power is not 
assured from these sources [cite].  Additionally, there are advances in communication technologies 
and sensors to better manage the microgrid.  Microgrid control can be achieved through central 
control or through a decentralized control architecture (Colson and Nehrir (2009), Lopes et al. 
(2006)).   
Energy Storage:  The storage of energy is not an essential microgrid function, but for microgrid 
performance, energy storage is generally needed to help balance energy generation and loads, aid 
in frequency and voltage control, and to increase microgrid resiliency. Military microgrids often 
contain energy storage systems such as batteries (lead acid, lithium, flow, etc.), mechanical storage 
(compressed air, flywheel, pump storage hydro, etc.), supercapacitors, thermal (cryogenic, ice stor-
age, molten salt storage, etc.), and other storage methods (hydrogen storage, etc.) (US EPA 
(2015)).  Site-specific constraints and microgrid requirements often dictate what energy storage 
technologies are implemented on a microgrid.  For instance, some residential homes have battery 
storage (lithium-ion, lead acid, etc.) for electrical energy while some large buildings have a variety 
of thermal storage (primarily ice storage and some cryogenic) for building thermal management 
(EIA (2018)).  In some cases, hybrid or electric vehicles can be tied into microgrids to provide 
battery storage capacity ((iea) (2014), Lu and Hossain (2015)). 
System Architecture 
A system architecture describes system elements and how they are related to each other.  Figure 3 
shows a typical military microgrid architecture.  The microgrid has a power network that intercon-
nects various types of distributed energy resources to the loads and an energy storage subsystem. 
The energy generation subsystems may be dispatchable, meaning the microgrid control system can 
control the generation of energy, or not dispatchable.  Renewable energy sources such as wind and 
solar are non-dispatchable energy generators because there is little or no control of how much 
energy will be generated at any given time. 
In an ideal situation on a military microgrid, loads are partitioned into critical loads, which must 
be served regardless of any disruptions, and all other loads termed non-critical loads which can be 
curtailed during a disruption.  The definition of critical load depends on the installation's mission. 
The total energy required for the critical loads determines the necessary resilience of the microgrid 
because these are the loads that must be served if any disruption occurs to the connection to exter-
nal power grid.  In practice, critical loads and non-critical loads are not always partitioned on the 
power network in an easily dispatchable manner to enable load-shedding of non-critical loads 
while preserving power delivery to critical loads. 
The energy storage 
system serves multi-
ple purposes, but pri-
marily from an energy 
security perspective, 
the energy storage en-
ables the microgrid to 
balance supply and 
demand.  The archi-
tecture also highlights 
the need for inverters 
between AC and DC 
because most loads 
will be AC, while 
many of the renewable energy sources generate DC power. 
System Operating Modes 
In addition to the functional perspective, it is also useful to consider microgrids from a state per-
spective.  IEEE Standard 1547.4-2011 defines four normal operating modes for microgrids: grid-
connected mode (or normal operating mode), transition-to-island mode, island mode, and recon-
nection mode.  Figure 4 graphically shows the states that a microgrid operates in and how transi-
tions between the states can be made. 
Figure 3: Microgrid Physical Architecture. 
Grid-connected Mode: This mode of opera-
tion is sometimes referred to as "normal parallel 
operation." During normal parallel operations, 
all the distributed resources in the microgrid 
(loads, generators, switches, MIC equipment) 
are operating within IEEE standards, or in con-
ditions agreed to in advance with the local util-
ity. Information from the microgrid must be 
provided to the microgrid controller device. 
Transition-to-island Mode: The microgrid 
can transition from normal parallel operation to 
a transition-to-island mode as a result of either 
planned or unplanned events that cause a dis-
ruption to the power being delivered by the lo-
cal utility. During transition-to-island there 
must be sufficient power generation or energy storage resources to provide stable voltage and fre-
quency until a successful transition can be accomplished. Of particular concern in this operational 
mode is the dampening of transients produced in the microgrid quickly enough to avoid protective 
devices in the microgrid from tripping. 
Island Mode: In island mode, the microgrid is isolated from the local utility and now assumes 
responsibility for actively maintaining the microgrid voltage and frequency within agreed upon 
ranges. If there are multiple participating power sources or energy storage devices in the microgrid, 
they must be controlled and synchronized to meet the needs of the microgrid stakeholders. In some 
cases, demand side control is also incorporated to maintain microgrid operation. 
Reconnection Mode: Before a microgrid can be reconnected to the local utility, the microgrid 
control must determine that the local utility is stable and operating within acceptable parameters. 
In a system architecture that includes multiple microgrids, the reconnections may be intentionally 
staggered to aid synchronization. There are at least three ways to reconnect microgrids from island 
mode back to normal parallel operation (IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 21 (2011)). The 
key issue is synchronization of voltage, frequency, and phase angle between the microgrid and the 
local utility. In active synchronization, the local utility and the microgrid system conditions are 
sensed and passed to a control mechanism that actively adjusts parameters until they are within 
acceptable limits. In passive synchronization, the microgrid's paralleling device is monitored until 
the local utility and microgrid are within acceptable limits before initiating reconnection. A third 
method is to use open-transition transfer, during which the microgrid load and any distributed 
resources in the microgrid are de-energized prior to reconnection. This approach has the advantage 
of not requiring system synchronization sensors, but is disruptive to the operations of the loads 
served within the microgrid. 
Figure 4: Microgrid States.
Research Issues Concerning Systems Engineering of Microgrids 
Microgrid Architecture Design 
Systems engineering approaches system design in a top-down fashion of architecture design fol-
lowed by system design.  Systems engineers often further divide system architecture into opera-
tional, functional, and physical architectures.  The architecture defines the structure of the elements 
and the relationships between them.  Microgrid architecture design decisions include: 1) energy 
generation types and capacities, 2) microgrid configuration layout, 3) energy storage system (ESS) 
type, size, and location, 4) AC or DC grid, 5) control methods, 6) level of load shedding control, 
7) protection, and 8) performance criteria.  Liu, Gorgiadis, and Pistikopoulos (2013)find many
microgrids are not realizing their potential benefits because the microgrids lack a suitable archi-
tecture or do not have a suitable operational strategy.  These shortfalls lead Liu, Georgiadis, and
Pistikopoulos to recommend a systems engineering approach.
Jones (Jones (2018)) discusses how engineering of microgrids is fragmented with engineers fo-
cused on their specialty and often not considering or fully appreciating how it will integrate with 
the other components of the microgrid.  He traces this mentality to the design of the overall electric 
power grid in which each component can be designed in relative isolation because of the network 
architecture.  Microgrids by contrast require tight coordination between generation and loads. 
Jones states, “The team tasked with engineering a microgrid needs to understand how the system 
will work as a whole, how the components work individually and how they must interact with 
another.”  This is a potential research area for systems engineering to develop the microgrid archi-
tecture to provide the basis for how the components are all intended to integrate together.   
ESS is one element of microgrid architecture which is important to microgrid operations. ESS in 
microgrids serve multiple functional roles.  Some microgrids use ESS for load-shifting in which 
the ESS stores energy during peak generation periods and then discharges the energy to the mi-
crogrid during peak demand periods.  ESS also can provide power regulation.  A common role of 
ESS is to provide for stand-by power loss. During the transition-to-island mode operation, ESS 
can  maintain power to critical loads by meeting the momentary shortfall between generation and 
load until slower responding generation sources, such as diesel generators, can come online 
(Castillo et al. (2016)). Current backup power systems with diesel generator backup power use 
uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) to maintain power to those loads which cannot tolerate any 
power interruption (Stamp (2012)). We identify nine properties of ESS normally considered in 
architecture design as power capacity (MW), energy capacity (MWh), ramp rate, location, re-
sponse granularity, response frequency, control and communication, response time, and imple-
mentation requirements.  
The several existing design tools for microgrids primarily focus on economic optimization while 
not adequately considering issues of resilience and other topics of concern to DoD microgrids. 
DER-CAM is a design tool based on a mixed-integer programming model to determine the best 
distributed energy resources to minimize total operating costs.  The Microgrid Design Toolkit 
(MDT) from Sandia develops the tradespace for multiple objectives although most implementa-
tions ignore many DoD microgrid concerns.  HOMER is another microgrid tool that is based on a 
simulation model but cannot fully address DoD microgrid issues.  XENDEE is a microgrid design 
tool that has seen recent traction within DoD although it is primarily sold as an economic analysis 
tool.  An open area of research is the need for microgrid design tools that can support DoD mi-
crogrid issues and design objectives.  Such a tool will need to span from the system architecture 
phase of system design through to maintenance and support, and will need to interface with exist-
ing electrical infrastructure modeling software packages through the detailed design phase. 
Trade Studies 
Much of the research on microgrids focuses on narrow questions suitable to optimization.  Opti-
mization techniques are less relevant however, when taking a broader, holistic perspective of the 
entire microgrid in the context of its environment. When you have multiple stakeholders, often 
with incommensurate goals, it is not possible to define a single overall system objective.   Addi-
tionally, there is the tension between the short-term costs of many components such as solar panels 
or batteries compared to the long-term and often non-tangible benefits received.  Consequently, a 
trade study to understand and support decisions seeking a balance between the many concerns 
becomes necessary.  Framing and conducting trade studies is a core knowledge area of the systems 
engineering discipline. 
Trade studies to analyze performance versus resiliency as well as other -ilities and cost must be 
performed because increases in resilience come at a cost beyond baseline operating costs.  One 
significant research issue that systems engineers must address is the life-cycle costing of various 
energy technologies and system architectures, as well as determining the right mix of technologies.  
Another area of research with regards to trade studies is the military microgrid design problem of 
sizing energy storage.  Most existing research focuses on optimize the economics of storage rather 
than other important factors such as resilience (Poonpun and Jewell (2008), Chen et al. (2011), 
Chen et al. (2011)). Determining the cost of resilience is important so decision makers can decide 
whether the investment is worthwhile.  Guidance for DoD approving officials on the value of en-
ergy security is lacking (Rusco and Lepore (2016)), resulting in inconsistent approaches. 
DoD 4170.11 Change 1 requires that projects for energy resiliency are life-cycle cost effective, 
and requires DoD Components to use National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Handbook 135, Life Cycle Costing Manual to determine life-cycle cost effectiveness. It further 
provides guidance for a 10-year simple payback period when making decisions to reduce energy 
usage (of Defense (2009)).  Castillo et al. provide guidance and tools for the DoD to use in making 
business case decisions on costs of difference strategies to reach resilience objectives (Castillo 
et al. (2016)). 
Use of Renewable Power Generation Sources 
The military's energy policy is driven by the need for ensuring energy security, resilience, and cost 
reduction.  The National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 requires military installations in the 
US to be energy efficient and produce or buy 25% of the total DoD energy use from renewable 
resources by 2025.  10 U.S. Code § 2911 requires that 25% of DoD total facility energy from 
renewable resource by 2025 (DOD (2019)). Renewable energy sources provide diversification 
away from traditional fuel sources, which can decrease fossil fuel usage and CO2 generation,  re-
siliency, and reduce lifecycle costs.  For example, an installation might rely completely on the 
regional power grid with backup diesel generators.  When a disruption occurs, the diesel generators 
are limited by the availability of fuel.  Renewable sources such as solar or wind can provide an 
important source of power and diversify the installation away from a reliance on fuel in the event 
of a natural disaster or attack where resupply is constrained. Renewable energy provides point-of-
use energy generation, smaller and decentralized power generation, free and inexhaustible source, 
and easy to rapidly install and deploy onsite. The contribution of renewable power generation 
sources to resiliency and the balance of peak shaving versus resiliency for military microgrids 
provides areas of interest for research. 
System of Systems and Microgrids 
The microgrid by itself is usually not a system of systems (SoS) because the microgrid authority 
almost always has managerial and operational control over all the component systems in the mi-
crogrid.  However, a microgrid is almost always part of a larger power grid SoS.  A microgrid will 
have multiple interactions with the larger SoS including electrical flows, information flows, con-
trol flows, as well as the flow of money.  Many microgrids use the main grid as the main power 
source, which the microgrid supplements with their DER.  Microgrids also must often coordinate 
their power generation and consumption with the larger grid. Kargarian, Falahati, and Fu 
(Kargarian et al. (2013)) illustrate the type of issues related to microgrids and SoS in which they 
model a distributed and connected set of microgrids as a SoS, and develop an optimization ap-
proach whereby each independent microgrid maximizes its profit, and then exchanges information 
with the distribution grid, which maximizes its profit.   Ouammi, Dagdougui, and Sacile [31] have 
also looked at the issue of control flows when they analyzed the case of four microgrids that co-
operate as well as interconnect to the larger power grid.  The main research issues in this area are 
coordination of the microgrid with other energy systems such as the grid; understanding and mod-
eling the interactions for failure analysis or other reasons since emergent behaviors may result; 
and developing control algorithms for the distributed energy network.  Existing systems engineer-
ing research into how SoS can prevent failure of the entire SoS when constituent members fail 
(Van Bossuyt et al. ()) may be useful in the context of DoD microgrids. 
Microgrid -ilities 
Military installations require energy security from the microgrid.  Energy security implies high 
reliability to meet critical loads, and it means resiliency to attacks as well as natural events.  Most 
microgrid research on resilience studies how the microgrid responds to natural disasters.  However, 
resilience with respect to attacks requires a different approach than resilience to natural disasters. 
Intentional attacks are not random events.  An attacker seeks out weaknesses in the system and 
tries to exploit them.  Attacks can come in the form of both physical attacks and cyberattacks, and 
as attacks to disrupt the incoming installation power or against the microgrid itself. Consequently, 
methods to increase resilience of microgrids must combine security analysis with the technical 
analysis of the microgrid.  
The focus of microgrids to support energy security and resiliency in DoD applications also requires 
different analysis approaches and system control strategies versus civilian microgrid system appli-
cations. Civilian microgrids may have objectives to minimize energy costs. Maintaining high ESS 
charge levels to maximize the time the microgrid can supply critical loads in the event of a loss of 
utility power would be favorable to using the ESS to perform peak shaving. Trade-offs between 
the cost of energy and energy security need to be balanced. 
Fathima and Palaniswamy (Fathima and Palanisamy (2015)) discuss the application of optimiza-
tion to microgrid design and find most papers seek to minimize some aspect of costs or the optimal 
size of energy generation components.  Khan (Khan et al. (2016)) extensively surveys papers on 
optimization of microgrids and overwhelmingly the objective is to minimize a cost function.  We 
were unable to find any papers optimizing the resilience or energy security of a microgrid, which 
would be of interest to military installations.   
Systems engineers can improve microgrid resilience by hardening the microgrid to avoid disrup-
tions, designing the microgrid to minimize the effect of any disruptions, and designing the mi-
crogrid to recover as quickly as possible.  Beyond the microgrid design issues to improve resili-
ency, there is the microgrid operational aspects of training personnel, having needed supplies and 
materials available, defining policies and procedures, and having the leadership to institute all the 
needed system and system operation aspects for resiliency (sometimes abbreviated as DOTLMPF).  
Another aspect of DoD microgrids that complicates understanding the resilience of a microgrid is 
identifying the critical loads and other power requirements that support critical base missions. 
Identifying critical loads is a non-trivial task often overlooked in the existing research literature.   
Most DoD facilities have backup generators connected to critical loads to minimize the impact of 
any power disruptions (Castillo et al. (2016)).  In the context of resilience engineering, failure of 
a system such as a microgrid is seen as the inability of the system to adapt to real-world conditions 
(Madni and Jackson (2009), Hollnagel et al. (2006), Jackson (2010)).  In the context of DoD mi-
crogrids, resiliency encompasses not only issues associated with civilian microgrids such as 
storms, failed equipment, changing loads, etc., but also encompasses malicious attacks (both phys-
ical and cyber) and adverse environments (arctic, desert, tropical, ocean). 
Utilities typically measure electric grid reliability using two indices of System Average Interrup-
tion Frequency Index (SAIFI) and System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) (Cepin 
(2011), Allan (1996)).  In the presence of momentary faults due to severe weather events, utilities 
started to use the Momentary Interruptions Per Customer Index (MAIFI).  An issue for a military 
microgrid is how to define suitable measures to guide the design decisions. SAIFI and SAIDI are 
likely not suitable measures for military microgrid reliability because a military installation does 
not serve customers in the same sense as a utility.  Rather, the military installation likely has critical 
loads tied to its mission, and any measure must be tied to this objective.  One such measure is the 
Mission Dependency Index (MDI) that was developed to better understand the inter-relation be-
tween microgrid reliability and the impact a microgrid’s reliability has on completing the mission 
of a base (Command (2018)).  However, MDI has a number of shortcomings as a useful measure. 
Designers can improve system resilience by incorporating redundancy into the system, automating 
switching between elements of the architecture, hardening system elements, being able to sense 
issues and having a communication and control system to react quickly to potential problems, and 
including reconfigurable elements that can be used to bypass damaged or destroyed portions of a 
microgrid.  Resilience can also be improved through system architectures which incorporate fea-
tures such as decentralized controls (Colson et al. (2011), Danzi et al. (2018)), incorporation of 
demand response (Pourmousavi and Nehrir (2012)), and communication protocols which are less 
susceptible to attack (Danzi et al. (2018)). While civilian microgrid resiliency decisions are often 
strongly driven by cost considerations, DoD microgrid resiliency decisions may be more driven 
by mission considerations such as how critical it is to have a microgrid that can continue to supply 
power to critical loads under adverse conditions.  Similarly, a rapidly reconfigurable microgrid 
may be desirable for DoD applications to quickly bypass damaged components or subsystems so 
that power delivery can resume rapidly. 
Microgrid Acquisitions 
The DoD can procure microgrids as part of traditional energy infrastructure acquisition methods 
with Congressional-appropriated Military Construction (MILCON) funds. The most flexible and 
widely used option is the Energy Resiliency and Conservation Investment Program (ERCIP) 
((ODASD(IE)) (2018)). This program is authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2914 and has $150M in 
annual funding planned for FY2020 for energy resilience, energy security, or energy conservation 
MILCON projects which improve mission assurance or provide payback. 
Additional options use third-party financing which is paid back via the savings generated from the 
project. Utility Energy Service Contracts (UESCs) and Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
(ESPCs) are two options available to DoD ((ODASD(IE)) (2018)). However, a net positive pay-
back for microgrids is often not achievable, and these acquisition alternatives may not support the 
acquisition of microgrids to support resiliency objectives. Changes in acquisition regulations and 
guidance on how to use third party financing to buy resiliency in a manner cost effective in com-
parison to buying other resiliency measures through MILCON would be an area worth researching. 
The DoD is restricted to acquiring only U.S.-made (or allied nations-made) equipment for power 
distribution equipment and wire (48 CFR § 225.401-70), and for photovoltaic devices (48 CFR § 
225.7017). These restrictions limit procurement options and can increase costs as compared to a 
civilian microgrid.  Additional requirements and restrictions as part of the DoD and federal gov-
ernment acquisition process can lead to challenging acquisition situations.  Existing research and 
civilian industry practice can indicate a better solution than DoD microgrid acquisitions; however, 
this is often because said industry practices and existing research don’t have to address require-
ments that are more common to DoD applications than civilian applications.  For instance, in ad-
dition to the above mentioned acquisition requirements, DoD microgrids must sometimes operate 
in what is termed an “expeditionary mode”, i.e. be transportable and able to operate in potentially 
hostile locations in harsh environments (such as arctic regions, deserts, jungles, mountains, ocean 
environments) with a minimal amount of logistical support. In a fixed installation application, a 
microgrid is a type of infrastructure system that is almost never built from the ground up because 
military bases already have an electrical system to which the microgrid must interface. In an ex-
peditionary mode, a microgrid may operate largely in an island mode due to the unreliability or 
nonexistence of host electric power infrastructure in the area of operations.  
Conclusion 
Many communities and industrial facilities are designing and deploying microgrids consisting of 
distributed energy generation, energy storage, and energy consumption.  While electrical engineer-
ing research and industrial practice support civilian microgrid development, to date, the systems 
engineering community has not done much research directly related to military microgrids.  Mili-
tary microgrids share all the same issues and characteristics of civilian microgrids with the primary 
difference being military microgrids are more concerned with energy security, whereas civilian 
microgrids are more concerned with cost and environmental issues.   
Much existing research on microgrids is narrowly focused on particular aspects such as energy 
storage or objectives such as cost minimization.  A systems perspective necessarily considers mul-
tiple aspects and objectives simultaneously.  This paper reviewed microgrids from a systems en-
gineering perspective and identified the relevant research issues where the systems engineering 
community can contribute to this field.  We urge the systems engineering community to become 
more involved in addressing DoD microgrid issues; we believe by addressing DoD microgrid is-
sues, DoD microgrids will better serve their intended purposes and civilian microgrids will also 
see benefits. 
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